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DNA order screening

DNA synthesis screening. Screen synthetic DNA orders and customers to block bioweapon ingredients.

Lead costAlmost noneof America's lead over China, over 3 years
Cuts p(doom) by~0.2%from a 5% starting estimate
Holds up○ Training○ Lab's own use○ Public release
Enact it on the menuSee the findings

What it does

Companies that make synthetic DNA must screen orders and customers so no one can buy the genetic material for a dangerous pathogen, including designs an AI helped create.

Applies to: Providers of synthetic DNA and RNA.

Where things stand

A 2024 framework made screening a condition of federal research funding; a 2025 executive order called for it to be revised or replaced. A Cotton–Klobuchar bill introduced in January 2026 is in committee.

Why it costs almost no lead

The rule falls on DNA synthesis companies, not AI developers. It closes one route by which AI could help someone build a bioweapon, at no cost to America's AI lead.

Biggest unknown: None for the lead. Whether screening works against AI-designed sequences is a separate question.

Why it lowers p(doom) by ~0.2%

Stops someone from using AI's help to order the DNA for a bioweapon.

Biological weapons are one of the most cited ways AI could help cause mass casualties. Screening DNA orders blocks a key physical step.

The strongest case that it costs more

There is no plausible case that DNA screening slows frontier AI. Critics instead argue that screening alone will not hold as a choke point and that safeguards must also go into the AI models.

The debate

For

Sources

Rough starting points, not precise forecasts. Lead costs assume China doesn't depend on U.S. models, the case least favorable to safety laws, and count 3 years. On the menu you can change every assumption and put in your own numbers. Last priced 2026-09-26.